Recently a group of large developing countries started to emerge as important drivers of regional, and in some cases even global, change. "Anchor countries" are the largest economies of their respective home regions. Their rise implies a power shift in different spheres of economy and politics and brings about new patterns in the organization of global space. We analyse this shift with regard to the global economic order and to global security policy. Furthermore, we explore how the enhanced economic and military relevance of anchor countries is reflected in global governance institutions.
Anchor countries -a new concept to capture the regional and global role of "emerging economies"
During the last centuries, global economic and political power has been concentrated in the West. Industrialization and trade enabled European nations to accumulate capital in an unprecedented way and constitute themselves as truly global hegemonic powers. Subsequently, the rise of the United States of America challenged European supremacy and the US established themselves as the largest and most innovative economy and new political as well as military hegemon. The world economic and political order became dominated by the transatlantic West. Only after the Second World War, Japan emerged as a third driving force of the world economy. During most of the post-war period, global economic power was thus heavily concentrated in the Triad region consisting of North America, Europe and Japan (OHMAE 1985) . Almost all multinational corporations were based in the Triad, and almost the totality of technological innovations emerged here. The G7 (now G8, after the inclusion of Russia) was the largely undisputed club of the economically powerful nations. After the Second World War the Soviet Union also emerged as a military contender of the US, but the inefficiency of its economic system and collapse in the late 1980s and early 1990s halted its economic ascendance. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the USA emerged as the only superpower in global governance, especially due to its military supremacy, whereas economic power remained concentrated in the Triad.
Patterns of global economic geography strongly reflected this structure. Global maps of production, distribution of knowledge assets (e.g. global top universities, patents, leading multinationals), trade and finance flows, labour productivity, per capita income, energy consumption and many other topics related to economic development all revealed similar patterns of Triad dominance. Concentration of economic power was mirrored in political influence, e.g. representation in key institutions of global governance, such as the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN Security Council.
This situation is now changing fundamentally. A new group of countries from the "South" is emerging, with huge implications for the global economy and international politics. Using the terminology proposed by STAMM (2004) we call them "anchor countries". Anchor countries comprise the largest economies of each of the developing regions as defined by the World Bank plus those secondary economies that account for at least 20 % of the remaining regional GDP -or, to put it more simply, the Tilman Altenburg/Julia Leininger, Bonn Global shifts caused by the rise of anchor countries largest economies of the non-Triad regions. 15 countries are classified as anchor countries: Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, SaudiArabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey. 1 Emerging economies from the "South" are commonly termed "threshold countries" (Schwellenländer) or "Newly Industrializing Countries". None of these terms however is appropriate to capture the increasing role of these countries with regard to global economic and political power shifts that the anchor country concept describes. With regard to "threshold countries", STAMM (2004) rightly points out that the group of countries which are "at the threshold" to achieve a typical OECD profile with regard to human development, economic competitiveness, governance and environmental performance barely overlaps with the anchor country group. In fact, five out of 15 anchor countries are classified as lower-middleincome (Egypt, Indonesia, China, Thailand and Iran) and three even as low-income countries (Nigeria, Pakistan and India). Their high aggregate GDP is only due to their huge population size. If we take the Human Development Index as a more comprehensive measure of development, only four of the 15 anchor countries rank among the first 70 countries. According to Stamm's definition, only two anchor countries -Brazil and Mexico -can also be considered to be "at the development threshold" (see Fig. 1 ). The other fairly advanced countries tend to be relatively small, with little weight in the regional or world economy.
The anchor country concept highlights economic weight in regional and global terms, regardless of the countries' level of development. The anchor countries' relative size in the regional economy tends to generate strong economic and political spillovers into the respective regions and also goes along with a significant regional -sometimes also globalpolitical role. 2 The anchor country concept thus emphasizes the fact that a number of developing countries are becoming strong regional drivers and in some cases even gain significant influence on global affairs. We assume that this gain of influence is causing a global power shift. The current global power shift is unprecedented in history. Although the history of economic development has seen many cases of growth and decline (e.g. LANDES 1998) the recent rise of a group of new powers from the developing world is unique due to a combination of two factors: Extraordinarily high economic growth (particularly in China and recently also in India) and enormous size in population and geographic terms. In 2007, China and India alone accounted for 37.1 % of the global population (Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevölkerung 2007). Hence we are witnessing a marked increase of per capita GDP income of several billion people and, as a result, much increased consumption, higher education, new consumption patterns, increasing carbon emissions. The effects on the rest of the world are much larger than those of previous catch-up processes, e.g. those of Ireland or South Korea. Analytically we may distinguish three characteristics that set anchor countries apart from smaller developing countries (see Fig. 2 China increasingly powerful in international economics due to interdependence with US market. International financial regulation through IMF is limited because China challenges the IMF which it does not consider representative due to outdated quota system.
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Source: own compilation tries will continue to grow at above-average rates, so that their share in global production will increase significantly, e.g. "India's economy could be larger than Japan's by 2032, and China's larger than the US by 2041." (WILSON/ PURUSHOTHAMAN 2003, 4) . By 2050, none of the European economies would be among the six largest economies of the world (ibid.).
Economic spillovers from increased trade and investment
Given the relatively large size of their economies compared to their respective world regions, economic development trends in anchor countries impact significantly on the global economy, and on neighbouring countries within their regions in particular. The recent extraordinary growth of some of the largest economies -particularly China, India and Russia, but to a lesser extent also Argentina, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and others -has therefore much stronger economic spillover effects than high growth episodes in smaller countries would have. Again, China has by far the strongest impact, not only due to its country size and unique long-term hyper-growth, but also because of its strong export orientation. China's economy accounted for only 2.9 % of global GDP in 1978, increasing its share to 4.7 % in 2004 and, according to projections, will account for as much as 7.9 % by the year 2020. China's exports grew from 50 billion US$ in 1990 to more than 1,000 billion today (GU/ HUMPHREY/ MESSNER 2008).
Economic spillovers from anchor countries result from expansion on the demand and on the supply side. On the demand side, spending power concentrates in anchor countries at a dramatic pace. In a study on Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRIC), WILSON/ PU-RUSHOTHAMAN / FIOTAKIS (2004, 2 ff.) calculate that the number of middle class consumers with an income over $3,000 should double within three years in these economies. Within a decade over 800 million people will have crossed this threshold, while in 20 years there could be about 200 million people in these economies with incomes above $15,000. Never in history has such an increase been observed in terms of gross addition of numbers to the ranks of the consuming class. This will result in greatly increased demand, e.g. for consumer goods. China is projected to become the world's largest car market within 20 years, and India will become the second largest 15 years later. Global companies therefore increasingly reorient their strategies away from the (relatively) declining old industrialized countries to those of the dynamic anchor countries. This is reflected in increasing trade with, and increased foreign direct investment (FDI) in anchor countries, e.g. in 2005 213,5 billion US $, which are 22 % of the world total.
Demand also increases for energy and mineral resources. This is particularly relevant for resource-rich developing countries. In fact, the strong increase in imports -China's energy demand is expected to double by 2015, and India's to increase by 50 % (KAPLINSKY/ MESSNER 2008) -has already driven up global commodity prices, which in turn resulted in stronger economic growth in the developing world. Both Africa and Latin America have, in the last four years, achieved significantly higher economic growth than ever since the 1970s. Natural resource exporters have benefited the most.
On the supply side, consumers in the rest of the world benefit from cheaper imports, e.g. of textiles from China. Similarly, multinational corporations can source inputs at lower costse.g. IT-services from India -and thereby increase their competitiveness. At the same time, increasing exports from China and other lowcost large-scale producers greatly increase competition for established producers, both at home and in third markets. This is a serious challenge for industries that compete directly with products from anchor countries, from small-scale footwear producers in Honduras to electronics manufacturers in Hungary and software developers in Germany.
Adding to these trade effects, companies from anchor countries increasingly invest abroad. This is a rather new phenomenon. The economic spillovers have a strongly differentiating impact on other countries, e.g. depending on whether the latter are mainly competitors or suppliers of complementary goods. In addition, they enhance structural change within other countries. European producers for example are increasingly forced to abandon knowledge-extensive consumer goods and shift towards more innovative products that cannot yet be supplied by anchor countries. Developing countries have an incentive to shift from manufacturing, where competition becomes more fierce, to export production of raw materials. The geographic implications of such shifts within and between countries are unprecedented in recent history and not yet well researched.
Industrial upgrading and its challenges for OECD countries
From the perspective of the early industrializers of the Triad, the rise of anchor countries creates a strong challenge to step up their efforts in science, technology and innovation. Some of the anchor countries, particularly Brazil and China, have made some progress in shifting from standardized manufacturing and outsourced low-cost activities to building knowledge-based competitive advantages (AL-TENBURG/ SCHMITZ/ STAMM 2008). This is particularly true for China, which increased its share of high-technology exports in total exports from 7.9 to 29.9 % between 1996 29.9 % between and 2005 29.9 % between (OECD 2007 . China is now spending 1.3 % of its GDP on research and development (R&D), having doubled this percentage in less than 10 years. In absolute terms, China is already one of the biggest spenders of R&D worldwide, and spending increases much faster than in the EU (ibid. 23). The number of researchers is at the same level as that of the EU 25 and second only to that of the United States (HUANG/SOETE 2007, 9) . Also in India, 350,000 engineering graduates are released to the labour market each year (BOUND 2007, 9 Despite their rapid progress, thus far only few anchor country firms or clusters of firms are seriously challenging knowledge-based competitive advantages of the old industrialized nations. However, they do already create pressure to intensify innovation efforts in order to upgrade into high-technology fields that are sheltered from price-based competition from the emerging economies. Furthermore, multinational corporations purchase more knowledge-based inputs from anchor countries, thereby developing new spatial patterns of value chain organization.
The role of anchor countries as security players
In a similar way, anchor countries are increasingly important players in international security politics. They have been increasing their material basis of military action since 1990; i.e. their military expenditure has been increasing in line with their economic growth (see Tab. 2). In some cases this material increase goes along with a more active political engagement in international security politics. Against this background four global trends can be identified:
1. More than 50 % of existing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are located in anchor countries, including nuclear arms. By further increasing their stocks of WMD they are contributing to further endanger world peace. This applies especially to anchor countries of South Asia (India, Pakistan) and the Wider Middle East.
2. Small arms are a major global problem, which is also caused by anchor countries. 
Weapons of mass destruction and small arms
More than half of the anchor countries dispose of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, which means between 26,7 % (ballistic missiles) and 66,7 % (biological weapons) of all states in possession of WMD (ibid.).
In the group of anchor countries South Asian and the Middle Eastern states stand out with regard to WMD, especially nuclear weapons (see Tab. 3). China and Russia possess nuclear weapons as declared by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) of 1970 (both belong to the five "nuclear weapons states" as declared by this treaty). Two others, India and Pakistan, are nuclear powers without being members of the NNPT regime (Israel counts as another nuclear weapon state, not engaged in the NNPT regime). After 1998, when India conducted first nuclear tests, it has been continuously increasing its arsenal of WMD, including nuclear weapons (MÜLLER/RAUCH 2007). India defends this nuclear strategy by referring to its neighbouring nuclear powers, China and especially Pakistan. The latter already has gone to war with India three times over the question of the border region Kashmir (1947-49; 1965; 1971 (Fig. 3) . In the following, attention will be exemplarily drawn to recent developments of new coalitions between and initiated by anchor countries as well as their impact on international institutions in global economic and security governance.
Shifts of economic spaces: New coalitions, global and regional institutions
Global economic and financial governance has so far been dominated by a northern "club of the few", G7, respectively G8, the international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank) and WTO. 8 In the 1970s G6 was established to facilitate dialogue on economic cooperation. At that time first six, than seven states were considered to be the major global economic players -Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and USA. In the 1990s it evolved Source: own compilation to G8, being enlarged by Russia. Since its time of creation G7 has evolved effectively to a crucial forum for international agenda-setting and decision-making on global economic and lately also on more general issues (GSTÖHL 2007, 32 ff.; LESAGE 2007, 113 ; on the history of creation of G7/8 see GSTÖHL 2007). But during the last years critics have claimed that G8 lacks to represent emerging economic powers and developing countries. Against this background a renovation of North-South relations turned up: First, in 1999 G8 reacted to the financial crisis in Asia, Russia and Brazil by inviting twelve Southern and Northern nations of systemic importance for the financial system to build G20 (finance). Nine out of ten Southern states of G20 (finance) are anchor countries. In short, G20 (finance) came into being as an informal forum to promote dialogue on financial issues between South and North. Secondly, economically emerging anchor countries also question G8´s legitimacy. Although convinced of their legitimacy to decide upon issues of global interest, G8 members somehow give partial reason to its critics. In 2005 it started to recognize the increasing economic power of five non-G8 members, namely the G5 (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa) -formerly known as O5 = Outreach 5, taking the enlargement-perspective of the G8. -by inviting them to the annual G8 meetings on an informal basis. Some members, e.g. Great Britain, went even further and suggested that G8 should be enlarged to G13 (LESAGE 2007, 114) . In 2007 Germany's G8 presidency focused on improving the cooperation with anchor countries. As a result G8 and G5 established the "Heiligendamm process" in order to embark on results-oriented dialogue on four global issues: innovation, investment, development in Africa, science and technology (GNATH 2007, 38) . In autumn 2007 the "Heiligendamm process" was institutionalized at headquarters of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Emerging economies have not only led to a change of North-South relations, but also to a renovation of South-South constellations. In August 2003 another G20 9 was formed in order to create a block of developing countries in international trade negotiations of the Doha Round in Cancún, Mexico (see Tab. 1). Then, developing countries would not accept a draft proposal of the EU and USA, which claimed lower tariffs on industrial imports into developing countries, while tariffs on agricultural imports from developing countries should be maintained. This proposal catalyzed interests of diverging states such as China, Guatemala and Pakistan. Hence, Brazil initiated G20 and jointly with India, China ("the Big Three") and South Africa has taken a leading role to hold this group together. Although positions of singular states diversified since then, the two opposing blocks persist. As patterns of value chain organization become more complex, new regional production networks emerge, some of them at a large spatial scale. For example, an emerging pan-Asian production system combines advanced components and capital goods from Japan, Korea and Singapore with simple inputs coming from other Asian economies; assembly takes place in China, but is more and more often supported by local R&D centres; and logistics services are located in Singapore or Hongkong (UNCTAD 2006, 14) . These new patterns challenge established Western producers at all stages of the value chain -not just the low-cost assembly operations. Furthermore, geographic location in relation to such production networks greatly influences the development opportunities of countries. The fact that Vietnam, for example, is among the most rapidly growing economies of the world -despite anachronistic forms of economic governance by a communist party and a considerable percentage of state-owned enterprises -can largely be attributed to its favourable location amidst the worlds most thriving economic region. Yet so far few geographers have studied the local, regional and global implications of these emerging networks.
In a similar way, political and military power blocs and alliances are changing. New regional powers are challenging the USA as a the previously undisputed hegemon. New South-South alliances emerge and new global institutions are challenging the industrialized countries dominance in institutions of global governance. The analysis has also shown that economic, political and military power shifts are interdependent. For example, economic growth heightens the importance of energy security, which in turn determines the emerging countries' foreign policies, military alliances, and their stance with regard to global institutions.
These interdependencies and the resulting global power shifts are increasingly attracting the attention of researchers from economic and political sciences. The rise of anchor countries however also opens up an extensive new research agenda for economic geographers. For example, further research is needed to explore the differential impact of the economic and political rise of anchor countries, both in other developing and in industrialized countries. Likewise, geographers may bring in new perspectives to analyze the interconnectedness of different spatial scales, e.g. how local and national climate change action correlates greenhouse gas emissions and the political stance of anchor countries with regard to global climate governance. tions with a wide range of members, but they have been dominated by industrialized countries of the "North". 9 G20 (Cancún) of developing countries already surpasses 20 members and therefore, is also called G20+.
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